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Abstract
Ap r e d i c t o ri sa s k e dt or a n ke v e n t u a l i t i e sa c c o r d i n gt ot h e i rp l a u -
sibility, based on past cases. We assume that she can form a ranking
given any memory that consists of ￿nitely many past cases. Mild con-
sistency requirements on these rankings imply that they have a numer-
ical representation via a matrix assigning numbers to eventuality-case
pairs, as follows. Given a memory, each eventuality is ranked accord-
ing to the sum of the numbers in its row, over cases in memory. The
number attached to an eventuality-case pair can be interpreted as the
degree of support that the past lends to the plausibility of the eventual-
ity. Special cases of this result may be viewed as axiomatizing kernel
methods for estimation of densities and for classi￿cation problems.
Interpreting the same result for rankings of theories or hypotheses,
rather than of speci￿c eventualities, it is shown that one may ascribe
to the predictor subjective conditional probabilities of cases given the-
ories, such that her rankings of theories agree with rankings by the
likelihood functions.
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11 Introduction
Prediction is based on past cases. As Hume (1748) argued, ￿From causes
which appear similar we expect similar eﬀects. This is the sum of all our ex-
perimental conclusions.￿ Over the past decades Hume￿s approach has found
re-incarnations in the arti￿cial intelligence literature as reasoning by analo-
gies, reasoning by similarities, or case-based reasoning. (See Schank (1986)
and Riesbeck and Schank (1989).) Many authors accept the view that analo-
gies, or similarities to past cases hold the key to human reasoning. Moreover,
the literature on machine learning and pattern recognition deals with using
past cases, or observations, for predicting or classifying new data. (See, for
instance, Forsyth and Rada (1986) and Devroye, Gyor￿, and Lugosi (1996).)
But how should past cases be used? How does, and how should one resolve
con￿icts between diﬀerent analogies? To address these questions, let us ￿rst
consider a few examples.
Example 1: A die is rolled over and over again. One has to predict
the outcome of the next roll. As far as the predictor can tell, all rolls were
made under identical conditions. Also, the predictor does not know of any a-
priori reason to consider any outcome more likely than any other. The most
reasonable prediction seems to be the mode of the empirical distribution,
namely, the outcome that has appeared most often in the past. Moreover,
empirical frequencies suggest a plausibility ranking of all possible outcomes,
and not just a choice of the most plausible ones.1
Example 2: A physician is asked by a patient if she predicts that a
surgery will succeed in his case. The physician knows whether the procedure
succeeded in most cases in the past, but she will be quick to remind her
patient that every human body is unique. Indeed, the physician knows that
1The term ￿likelihood￿ in the context of a binary relation, ￿at least as likely as￿, has
been used by de Finetti (1937) and by Savage (1954). It should not be confused with
￿likelihood￿ in the the context of likelihood functions, also used in the sequel. At this
point we use ￿likelihood￿ and ￿plausibility￿ informally and interchangeably.
2the statistics she read included patients who varied in terms of age, gender,
medical condition, and so forth. It would therefore be too naive of her to
quote statistics as if the empirical frequencies were all that mattered. On
the other hand, if the physician considers only past cases of patients that are
identical to hers, she will probably end up with an empty database.
Example 3: An expert on international relations is asked to predict
the outcome of the con￿ict in Kosovo. She is expected to draw on her vast
knowledge of past cases, coupled with her astute analysis thereof, in forming
her prediction. As in Example 2, the expert has a lot of information she
can use, but she cannot quote even a single case that was identical to the
situation at hand. Moreover, as opposed to Example 2, even the possible
eventualities are not identical to outcomes that occurred in past cases.
We seek a theory of prediction that will make use of the available infor-
mation, but will allow diﬀerent past cases to have diﬀerential relevance to the
prediction problem. Speci￿cally, we consider a prediction problem for which
a set of possible eventualities is given. This set may or may not be an ex-
haustive list of all conceivable eventualities. We do not model the process by
which such a set is generated. Rather, we assume the set given and restrict
attention to the problem of qualitative ranking of its elements according to
their likelihood.
The prediction rule Consider the following prediction rule, say, for
Example 2. The physician considers all known cases of successful surgery.
She uses her subjective judgment to evaluate the similarity of each of these
cases to the patient she is treating, and she adds them up. She then does the
same for unsuccessful treatments. It seems reasonable that the outcome with
the larger aggregate similarity value will be her prediction. This generalizes
frequentist ranking to a ￿fuzzy sample￿: in both examples, likelihood of an
outcome is measured by summation over cases in which it occurred. Whereas
in Example 1 the weight attached to each past case is 1, in this example this
weight varies according to the physician￿s subjective assessment of similarity
3of the relevant cases. Rather than a dichotomous distinction between data
points that do and those that do not belong to the sample, each data point
belongs to the sample to a certain degree, say, between 0 and 1.
The prediction rule we propose can also be applied to Example 3 as
follows. For each possible outcome of the con￿ict in Kosovo, and for each
past case, the expert is asked to assess a number, measuring the degree of
support that the case lends to this outcome. Adding up these numbers, for all
known cases and for each outcome, yields a numerical representation of the
likelihood ranking. Thus, our prediction rule can be applied also when there
is no structural relationship between past cases and future eventualities.
Formally, let M denote the set of known cases. For each c ∈ M and each
eventuality x,l e tv(x,c) ∈ R denote the degree of support that case c lends
to eventuality x. Then the prediction rule ranks eventuality x as more likely






Axiomatization The main goal of this paper is to axiomatize this rule.
We assume that a predictor has a ranking of possible eventualities given any
possible memory (or database). A memory consists of a ￿nite set of past
cases, or stories. The predictor need not envision all possible memories. She
might have a rule, or an algorithm that generates a ranking (in ￿nite time)
for each possible memory. We only rely on qualitative plausibility rankings,
and do not assume that the predictor can quantify them in a meaningful
way. Cases are not assumed to have any particular structure. However, we
do assume that for every case there are arbitrarily many other cases that
are deemed equivalent to it by the predictor (for the prediction problem at
hand). For instance, if the physician in Example 2 focuses on ￿ve parameters
of the patient in making her prediction, we can imagine that she has seen
arbitrarily many patients with particular values of the ￿ve parameters. The
equivalence relation on cases induces an equivalence relation on memories
(of equal sizes), and the latter allows us to consider replication of memories,
4that is, the disjoint union of several pairwise equivalent memories.
Our main assumption is that prediction satis￿es a combination axiom.
Roughly, it states that if an eventuality x is more likely than an eventuality
y given two possible disjoint memories, then x is more likely than y also given
their union. For example, assume that the patient in Example 2 consults two
physicians, who were trained in the same medical school but who have been
working in diﬀerent hospitals since graduation. Thus, the physicians can
be thought of as having disjoint databases on which they can base their
prediction, while sharing the inductive algorithm. Assume next that both
physicians ￿nd that success is more likely than failure in the case at hand.
Should the patient ask them to share their databases and re-consider their
predictions? If the inductive algorithm that the physicians use satis￿es the
combination axiom, the answer is negative.
We also assume that the predictor￿s ranking is Archimedean in the follow-
ing sense: if a database M renders eventuality x more likely than eventuality
y, then for every other database N there is a suﬃciently large number of
replications of M, such that, when these memories are added to N,t h e y
will make eventuality x more likely than eventuality y. Finally, we need an
assumption of diversity, stating that any list of four eventualities may be
ranked, for some conceivable database, from top to bottom. Together, these
assumptions necessitate that prediction be made according to the rule sug-
gested by the formula (◦) above. Moreover, we show that the function v in
(◦) is essentially unique.
This result can be interpreted in several ways. From a descriptive view-
point, one may argue that experts￿ predictions tend to be consistent as re-
quired by our axioms (of which the combination is the most important), and
that they can therefore be represented as aggregate similarity-based predic-
tions. From a normative viewpoint, our result can be interpreted as sug-
gesting the aggregate similarity-based predictions as the only way to satisfy
our consistency axioms. In both approaches, one may attempt to measure
5similarities using the likelihood rankings given various databases.
Observe that we assume no a priori conceptual relationship between cases
and eventualities. Such relationships, which may exist in the predictor￿s
mind, will be revealed by her plausibility rankings. Further, even if cases
and eventualities are formally related (as in Example 2), we do not assume
that a numerical measure of distance, or of similarity is given in the data.
Axiomatization of kernel methods A well-known statistical problem
is the estimation of a density function, based on a ￿nite sample of observa-
tions. In this case, a common statistical technique is kernel estimation (see
Akaike (1954), Rosenblatt (1956), Parzen (1962), and Silverman (1986) and
Scott (1992) for recent texts): a kernel function k(x,y) is chosen, and the




other words, every observation xi is assumed to make every y in its vicinity
(as de￿ned by the kernel function k) more likely.
Kernel estimation of density functions is a special case of our model.
Thus, when our model is applied to the special structure above, it can be
viewed as axiomatizing this estimation method. This may serve as a norma-
tive justi￿cation for this method, as well as a de￿nition of the kernel function
in terms of qualitative plausibility rankings.
Kernel methods have also been applied to classi￿cation problems. In
such a problem a classi￿er is equipped with a set of data points for which the
correct class is given, and it is asked to classify the next data point. Kernel
methods employ a kernel function de￿ned on pairs of data points, and, for
each possible class, compute the sum, over all examples of this class, of the
kernel function between these known examples and the new data point. A
maximizer of this sum is chosen as the classi￿cation of the new data point.
Clearly, kernel classi￿cation methods are a special case of our prediction
rule. Indeed, our description of the prediction rule in Example 2 can be
viewed as a generalization of kernel classi￿cation to a situation where the
data need not be points in a Euclidean space, and where distance, similarity,
6or kernel functions are not given a-priori.
When applied to the special case of classi￿cation problems, our result can
be used to derive an axiomatization of kernel methods. This can be used to
justify these methods, and to de￿ne a subjective kernel function based on
qualitative plausibility rankings.
Axiomatization of maximum likelihood Prediction is not restricted
to single cases. Often one is asked to choose not only the most plausible
outcome in a given instance, but the most plausible theory, or hypothesis.
How should we use cases in this problem?
We argue that our axioms are reasonable for this case as well. Indeed,
the main axiom is that, if, based on each of two disjoint databases, we tend
to prefer theory T to theory T 0, we should have the same preference based
on the union of the databases. Hence our rule is also a reasonable suggestion
for ranking theories given data: every theory and every case are ascribed a
number, and the plausibility of a theory is measured by the summation of
the numbers corresponding to it, over all cases in memory.
Let us suppose that the numbers assigned to theory-case pairs are neg-
ative. They can then be viewed as the logarithms of the conditional prob-
abilities of cases given theories. Summing up these numbers over all cases
corresponds to multiplying the conditional probabilities. In other words, the
numerical function that measures the plausibility of a theory is simply the
log-likelihood function.
Thus our theorem can be viewed as an axiomatization of likelihood rank-
ing. Given a qualitative ￿at least as plausible as￿ relation between theories
we derive numerical conditional probabilities for each theory and each case,
together with the algorithm that ranks theories based on their likelihood
function, under the assumption that all cases were statistically independent.
While the conditional probabilities we derive are unique only up to certain
transformations, our result does provide a compelling reason to use likelihood
rankings.
7Methodological remarks The Bayesian approach (Ramsey (1931), de
Finetti (1937), and Savage (1954)) holds that all prediction problems should
be dealt with by a prior subjective probability that is updated in light of
new information via Bayes￿ rule. This requires that the predictor have a
prior probability over a space that is large enough to describe all conceivable
new information. We ￿nd that in certain examples (as above) this assump-
tion is not cognitively plausible. By contrast, the prediction rule (◦)r e q u i r e s
the evaluation of support weights only for cases that were actually encoun-
tered. For an extensive methodological discussion, see Gilboa and Schmeidler
(2001).
Since the early days of probability theory, the concept of probability
serves a dual role: one relating to empirical frequencies, and the other ￿
to quanti￿cation of subjective beliefs or opinions. (See Hacking (1975).) The
Bayesian approach oﬀers a uni￿cation of these roles employing the concept
of a subjective prior probability. Our approach may also be viewed as an
attempt to unify the notions of empirical frequencies and subjective opinions.
Whereas the axiomatic derivations of de Finetti (1937) and Savage (1954)
treat the process of the generation of a prior as a black box, our rule aims to
make a preliminary step towards the modeling of this process.
Thus, our approach is complementary to the Bayesian approach at two
levels: ￿rst, it may oﬀer an alternative model of prediction, when the in-
formation available to the predictor is not easily translated to the language
of a prior probability. Second, our approach may describe how a prior is
generated. (See also Gilboa and Schmeidler (1999).)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the for-
mal model and the main results. Section 3 discusses the relationship to kernel
methods and to nearest neighbor approaches. Section 4 discusses the deriva-
tion of maximum likelihood rankings. Section 5 contains a critical discussion
of the axioms, attempting to outline their scope of application. Finally,
Section 6 brie￿y discusses alternative interpretations of the model, and, in
8particular, relates it to case-based decision theory. Proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
2M o d e l a n d R e s u l t
2.1 The framework
The primitives of our model consist of two non-empty sets X and C.W e
interpret X as the set of all conceivable eventualities in a given prediction
problem, p,w h e r e a sC represents the set of all conceivable cases.T o s i m -
plify notation, we suppress the prediction problem p whenever possible. The
predictor is equipped with a ￿nite set of cases M ⊂ C,h e rmemory, and her
task is to rank the eventualities by a binary relation, ￿at least as likely as￿.
While evaluating likelihoods, it is insightful not only to know what has
happened, but also to take into account what could have happened. The
predictor is therefore assumed to have a well-de￿ned ￿at least as likely as￿
relation on X for many other collections of cases in addition to M itself.
Let M be the set of ￿nite subsets of C. For every M ∈ M,w ed e n o t et h e
predictor￿s ￿at least as likely as￿ relation by %M ⊂ X ￿ X.
Two cases c and d are equivalent, denoted c ∼ d, if, for every M ∈ M such
that c,d / ∈ M, %M∪{c}=%M∪{d}. To justify the term, we note the following.
Observation: ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Note that equivalence of cases is a subjective notion: cases are equivalent
if, in the eyes of the predictor, they aﬀect likelihood rankings in the same
way. Further, the notion of equivalence is also context-dependent: two cases
c and d are equivalent as far as a speci￿c prediction problem is concerned.
We extend the de￿nition of equivalence to memories as follows. Two
memories M1,M 2 ∈ M are equivalent, denoted M1 ∼ M2,i ft h e r ei sab i j e c -
tion f : M1 → M2 such that c ∼ f(c) for all c ∈ M1. Observe that memory
equivalence is also an equivalence relation. It also follows that, if M1 ∼ M2,
then, for every N ∈ M such that N ∩ (M1 ∪ M2)=∅, %N∪M1=%N∪M2.
9Throughout the discussion, we impose the following structural assump-
tion.
Richness Assumption: For every case c ∈ C,t h e r ea r ei n ￿nitely many
cases d ∈ C such that c ∼ d.
A note on nomenclature: the main result of this paper is interpreted as
a representation of a prediction rule. Accordingly, we refer to a ￿predictor￿
who may be a person, an organization, or a machine. However, the result may
and will be interpreted in other ways as well. Instead of ranking eventualities
one may rank decisions, acts, or a more neutral term, alternatives.C a s e s ,
the elements of C, may also be called observations or facts. A memory M
in M represents the predictor￿s knowledge and will be referred to also as a
database.
2.2 The axioms
We will use the four axioms stated below. In their formalization let ￿M and
≈M denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of %M ,a su s u a l . %M is
complete if x %M y or y %M x for all x,y ∈ X.
A1 Order: For every M ∈ M, %M is complete and transitive on X.
A2 Combination: For every disjoint M,N ∈ M and every x,y ∈ X,i f
x %M y (x ￿M y)a n dx %N y,t h e nx %M∪N y(x ￿M∪N y).
A3 Archimedean Axiom: For every disjoint M,N ∈ M and every x,y ∈
X,i fx ￿M y, then there exists l ∈ N such that for any l-list (Mi)l
i=1 of
pairwise disjoint Mi￿s in M,w h e r ef o ra l li ≤ l, Mi ∼ M and Mi ∩ N = ∅,
x ￿M1∪...∪Ml∪N y holds.
Axiom 1 simply requires that, given any conceivable memory, the predic-
tor￿s likelihood relation over eventualities is a weak order. Axiom 2 states
that if eventuality x is more plausible than eventuality y given two disjoint
memories, x should also be more plausible than y given the union of these
memories. Axiom 3 is states that if, given the memory M,t h ep r e d i c t o r
10believes that eventuality x is strictly more plausible than y, then, no matter
what is her ranking for another memory, N, there is a number of ￿repetitions￿
of M that is large enough to overwhelm the ranking induced by N.
Finally, we need a diversity axiom. It is not necessary for representation
of likelihood relations by summation of real numbers. Theorem 1 below is an
equivalence theorem, characterizing precisely which matrices of real numbers
will satisfy this axiom.
A4 Diversity: For every list (x,y,z,w)o fd i s t i n c te l e m e n t so fX there
exists M ∈ M such that x ￿M y ￿M z ￿M w.I f |X| < 4, then for any
strict ordering of the elements of X there exists M ∈ M such that ￿M is
that ordering.
2.3 The main results
For clarity of exposition, we ￿rst formulate the key result.
Result: Let there be given X, C,a n d{%M}M∈M satisfying the richness





for every M ∈ M and every x,y ∈ X,





In other words, axioms A1-A4 imply that {%M}M∈M follow our prediction
rule for an appropriate choice of the matrix v. Not all of these axioms are,
however, necessary for the representation to obtain. Indeed, the axioms imply
special properties of the representing matrix v. First, it can be chosen in such
a way that equivalent cases are attached identical columns. Second, every
four rows of the matrix satisfy an additional condition. Existence of a matrix
v satisfying these two properties together with (∗) does imply axioms A1-
A4. Finally, the matrix v is essentially unique. Theorem 1 below states the
exact characterization and uniqueness results. Before stating the theorem,
we present two additional de￿nitions.
11De￿nition: A matrix v : X￿C → R respects case equivalence (with respect
to {%M}M∈M) if for every c,d ∈ C, c ∼ d iﬀ v(•,c)=v(•,d).
When no confusion is likely to arise, we will suppress the relations {%M}M∈M
and will simply say that ￿v respects case equivalence￿.
The following de￿nition applies to real-values matrices in general. It will
be used for the matrix v : X ￿ C → R in the statement of the theorem, but
also for another matrix in the proof. It de￿nes a matrix to be diversi￿ed if no
row in it is dominated by an aﬃne combination of any other three (or less)
rows. Thus, if v is diversi￿ed, no row in it dominates another. Indeed, the
property of diversi￿cation can be viewed as a generalization of this condition.
De￿nition: A matrix v : X ￿ Y → R,w h e r e|X| ≥ 4, is diversi￿ed if there
are no distinct four elements x,y,z,w ∈ X and λ,￿,θ ∈ R with λ+￿+θ =1
such that v(x,•) ≤ λv(y,•)) + ￿v(z,•)+θv(w,•). If |X| < 4, v is diversi￿ed
if no row in v is dominated by an aﬃne combination of the others.
We can ￿nally state
Theorem 1 : Let there be given X, C,a n d{%M}M∈M satisfying the rich-
ness assumption as above. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) {%M}M∈M satisfy A1-A4;
(ii) There is a diversi￿ed matrix v : X ￿ C → R that respects case equiva-





for every M ∈ M and every x,y ∈ X,





Furthermore, in this case the matrix v is unique in the following sense:
v and u both satisfy (∗) and respect case equivalence iﬀ there are a scalar
λ > 0 and a matrix β : X ￿ C → R with identical rows (i.e., with constant
columns), that respects case equivalence, such that u = λv + β.
12Observe that, by the richness assumption, C is in￿nite, and therefore
the matrix v has in￿nitely many columns. Moreover, the theorem does not
restrict the cardinality of X, and thus v may also have in￿nitely many rows.
2.4 Notes on the proof
The Result is part of Theorem 1, and was stated only for expository purposes.
We therefore prove only Theorem 1.
The notion of case equivalence allows us to reduce the discussion to vec-
tors of non-negative integers. We de￿ne the set of types of cases to be the
∼-equivalence classes: T = C/ ∼. Assume, for simplicity, that there are
￿nitely many types and ￿nitely many eventualities. Rather than referring
to sets of speci￿c cases (memories M), we focus on vectors of non-negative
integers. Such a vector I : T → Z+ represents many equivalent memories by
counting how many cases of each type are in each of these memories. Thus,
instead of dealing with subsets of the set C, most of the discussion will be
conducted in the space ZT
+. Next, using the combination axiom, we extend
the family rankings {”I} from I ∈ ZT
+ to I ∈ QT
+.
Focusing on two eventualities, x and y, we divide the vectors I ∈ QT
+ to
those that render x more likely than y, and to those that induce the opposite
ranking. Completeness and combination are the key axioms that allow us to
invoke a separating hyperplane theorem. With the aid of the Archimedean
axiom, one can prove that the separating hyperplane precisely characterizes
the memories for which x is (strongly or weakly) more likely than y.
If one has only two eventualities, the proof is basically complete. Most of
the work is in showing that the hyperplanes, which were obtained for each
pair of eventualities, can be represented by a single matrix. More concretely,
the separation theorem applied to a pair x,y yields a vector vxy, unique up
to multiplication by a positive constant, such that x is at least as likely as y
given memory I iﬀ vxy • I ≥ 0. One now wishes to ￿nd a vector vx for each
eventuality x such that vxy is a positive multiple of (vx−vy) (simultaneously
13for all x,y).
This can be done if and only if there is a selection of vectors {vxy}x,y
(where each is given only up to a multiplicative constant) such that vxz =
vxy + vyz for every triple x,y,z. It turns out that, due to transitivity, this
can be done for every triple x,y,z separately. The diversity axiom guarantees
that this can also be done for sets of four eventualities, and the proof proceeds
by induction.
The ￿nal two steps of the proof deal with extensions to in￿nitely many
types and to in￿nitely many eventualities.
2.5 Mathematical comments
Given any real matrix of order |X|￿| C| ,o n ec a nd e ￿ne for every M ∈ M
aw e a ko r d e ro nX through (∗). It is easy to see that it will satisfy A1 and
A2. If the matrix also respects case equivalence, A3 will also be satis￿ed.
However, these conditions do not imply A4. For example, A4 will be violated
if a row in the matrix dominates another row. Since A4 is not necessary for
a representation by a matrix v via (∗) (even if it respects case equivalence),
one may wonder whether it can be dropped. The answer is given by the
following.
Proposition 2 Axioms A1, A2, and A3 do not imply the existence of a
matrix v that satis￿es (∗).
Some remarks on cardinality are in order. Axiom A4 can only hold if the
set of types, T = C/ ∼, is large enough relatively to X. For instance, if there
are two distinct eventualities, the diversity axiom requires that there be at
least two diﬀerent types of cases. The following remark states that six types
suﬃce for X to have the cardinality of the continuum.
Remark 3 For any T such that |T| ≥ 6, there exists X with cardinality ℵ
and {%M}M∈M that satisfy A1-4.
14Finally, one may wonder whether (∗) implies that v respects case equiv-
alence. The negative answer is given below.
Remark 4 Condition (∗) does not imply that v respects case equivalence.
3 Axiomatization of Kernel Methods
3.1 Estimation of a density function
Assume that X is a continuous random variable taking values in Rm.H a v i n g
observed a ￿nite sample (xi)i≤n, one is asked to estimate the density func-
tion of X. Kernel estimation (see Akaike (1954), Rosenblatt (1956), Parzen
(1962), and Silverman (1986) for a survey) suggests the following. Choose a
(so-called ￿kernel￿) function k : Rm ￿ Rm → R+ with the following proper-
ties: (i) k(x,y) is a non-increasing function of kx − yk; (ii) for every x ∈ Rm,
R






The estimated density function f quanti￿es likelihood diﬀerences between
(small neighborhoods of) various points y. Let us now assume that, given
the sample x ≡ (xi)i≤n, the predictor is only asked to provide qualitative
￿at least as likely as￿ relations {%x} on Rm,w h e r ey ￿x z is interpreted to
mean that (a small neighborhood of) y is more likely than (the corresponding
neighborhood of)z given the sample x. Assume that the order of observations
in x =( xi)i≤n does not aﬀect the ranking %x.I n t h i s c a s e a v e c t o r x can
be identi￿ed with a ￿nite set of observations, each of which is an element of
Rm. To allow repetitions, one de￿nes C = Rm ￿ N,w h e r eac a s e( z,j) ∈
Rm ￿ N is interpreted as the j-th appearance of z in x =( xi)i≤n.F o ra n y
2More generally, the kernel may be a function of transformed coordinates. The following
discussion does not depend on assumptions (i) and (ii) and they are retained merely for
concreteness.
15￿nite M ⊂ C, %M is de￿ned as follows: %M=%x for some x =( xi)i≤n such
that, for every z ∈ Rm,# {i ≤ n|xi = z} =# {(z,j)|(z,j) ∈ M}.
Our axioms appear to be rather plausible in this set-up. Thus, the
theorem suggests that there are numbers, v(y,x), such that %x is repre-
sented by gx(y)=
P
i≤nv(y,xi). Up to normalization by a factor of n,
the function v can serve the role of the kernel function. That is, setting
k(x,y)=k(y,x)=nv(y,x), the function gx (de￿ned via v)c o i n c i d e sw i t h
the function f (de￿ned via k).
One may impose additional conditions on the collection of relations {%x}
such that the derived function v is (i) bounded; (ii) decreasing in distance;
(iii) continuous in x for every y. Such axioms would employ the special
structure of cases in this application. For instance, one may require that, if
kxi − yk = kx0
i − y0k and kxi − zk = kx0
i − z0k for every i ≤ n,t h e ny %x z
iﬀ y0 %x z0. Similarly, the natural topology on Rm can be used to state that
the set of observations x ∈ (Rm)n, for which y ￿x z, is open for all y,z ∈ Rm.
Deriving speci￿c results on kernel functions is beyond the scope of this
paper. At this point, we wish to point out that our theorem can be inter-
preted as a normative justi￿cation of kernel estimation, as well as a way to
calibrate the appropriate kernel function based on intuitive likelihood judg-
ments. Importantly, the kernel function k (or v) in our model is derived from
these qualitative judgments, rather than assumed primitive.
3.2 Kernel classi￿cation
Kernel methods are also used for classi￿cation problems. Assume that a
classi￿er is confronted with a data point y ∈ Rm, and it is asked to guess
to which member of a ￿nite set A it belongs. The classi￿er is equipped
with a set of examples M. Each example is a data point x ∈ Rm,w i t ha
known classi￿cation in A.K e r n e lc l a s s i ￿cation methods would adopt a kernel
function a above, and, given the point y,w o u l dg u e s st h a ty belongs to a
class a ∈ A that maximizes the sum of k(x,y)o v e ra l lx￿s in memory that
16were classi￿ed as a.
Our general framework can accommodate classi￿cation problems as well.
The special feature of classi￿cation problems is that each past cases speci-
￿es one of the objects to be ranked, namely, the classes, interpreted as the
￿correct￿ answer. To allow repetitions, we de￿ne the set of cases C to be
Rm ￿ A ￿ N.T h u s ,a ne x a m p l e( x,a) that appears in memory twice will be
coded as a pair of cases, (x,a,1) and (x,a,2), in each of which a data point
x in Rm was encountered, and its correct classi￿cation is known to have been
a ∈ A.
For the purpose of axiomatization, we assume that, for each data point
y,t h ec l a s s i ￿er can rank all possible classes, given every possible memory.3
That is, for a given (￿nite) memory M ⊂ Rm￿A￿N, classes in A are ranked
by %M,y⊂ A ￿ A. We will assume that (x,a,i) ∼ (x,a,j)f o ra l lx ∈ Rm,
a ∈ A,a n di,j ∈ N. Our main result suggests that, if {%M,y}M satisfy A1-4,
then there is a matrix v ≡ vy : A ￿ (Rm ￿ A ￿ N) → R, respecting case
equivalence, such that %M,y is represented by vy as follows:





This formulation allows an example of class d/ ∈ {a,b} to aﬀect the ranking
of class a vs. class b for a given y. There may be situations where one may
wish to allow such linkages. For instance, in classi￿cation of visual inputs
into the Latin alphabet, it is possible that similar data points that are known
to represent lower case ￿o￿ may make upper case ￿O￿ more likely than, say,
upper case ￿A￿. Yet, one may also impose an additional speci￿city axiom,
stating that the ranking between classes a and b depends solely on examples
of a or of b. For example, one may state the following axiom:
3Admittedly, a standard classi￿cation problem is less demanding in that it only requires
a choice of one class, and not a complete ordering of all classes. See the discussion of scoring
rules in voting theory in Section 6 below, and the comparison of our result to those of
Young (1975) and Myerson (1995).
17A5 Speci￿city: For every y,x ∈ Rm, M ∈ M,d i s t i n c ta,b,d ∈ A,a n d
i ∈ N, a %M,y b iﬀ a %M∪{(x,d,i)},y b.
This axiom yields a more compact representation:
Proposition 5 Assume that {”M,y}M∈M satisfy A1-4 and thus have a rep-
resentation as in Theorem 1 by a matrix vy. Then A5 is satis￿ed iﬀ there
exists a function sy : Rm ￿ A → R such that
vy(a,(x,b,i)) = sy(x,a)1a=b
(where 1a=b is 1 if a = b a n dz e r oo t h e r w i s e . )
Moreover, in this case the function sy is unique up to multiplication by
a positive constant.
This formulation is very similar to kernel classi￿cation methods. One
obvious diﬀerence is that the function sy above may depend not only on past
examples x, but also on the class considered a.T h i s ￿exibility might be
useful. For instance, in the example above, one may wish to give the letter
￿e￿ precedence, as a potential classi￿cation, over the letter ￿o￿. However,
should one wish to rule out this possibility, one may impose an additional
symmetry axiom on classes. It states that a permutation of the classes in the
examples results in the corresponding permutation in the ranking of these
classes for the new data point. Formally, let π : A → A be a permutation.
For M ∈ M,d e ￿ne π(M) ∈ M by (x,a,i) ∈ M iﬀ (x,π(a),i) ∈ π(M) for
every (x,a,i) ∈ C. Using this notation, we write
A6 Symmetry: For every permutation π,e v e r yM ∈ M, and every a,b ∈ A,
a %M b,i ﬀ π(a) %π(M) π(b).
Proposition 6 Assume that {”M,y}M∈M satisfy A1-4 and thus have a rep-
r e s e n t a t i o na si nT h e o r e m1b yam a t r i xvy. Then A5 and A6 are satis￿ed
iﬀ there exists a function sy : Rm → R such that
vy(a,(x,b,i)) = sy(x)1a=b.
18In particular, under A1-A6,
for every M ∈ M and every a,b ∈ A,





Moreover, in this case the function sy is unique up to multiplication by
a positive constant.
It is only left to de￿ne k(x,y)=sy(x) to obtain the familiar kernel
formulation. Observe, however, that the kernel function is given up to a
separate multiplicative constant for every y. In particular, k need not be
symmetric. It can be shown (see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995)) that k(•,y)
may be re-scaled (separately for each y) to become symmetric if, for every
x,y,z ∈ Rm,
k(x,y)k(y,z)k(z,x)=k(x,z)k(z,y)k(y,x).
As above, this axiomatization can be viewed as a normative justi￿cation of
kernel methods, and also as a way to elicit the ￿appropriate￿ kernel function
from qualitative ranking data. Again, our approach does not assume that a
kernel function is given, but derives such a function together with the kernel
classi￿cation rule.
3.3 Comparison with nearest-neighbor approaches
A popular alternative to kernel classi￿cation methods is oﬀered by nearest
neighbor methods. Given a new instance y, rather than ranging over all past
cases of all classes, a (single) nearest neighbor approach suggests to ￿nd an
example (x,a) in memory that minimizes a distance function d(x,y), and to
select a as the class to which y probably belongs.4 This algorithm appears
to be somewhat extreme: a single most-similar case belonging to class a
may outweigh dozens of slightly less similar cases all belonging to class b.
4As in the case of kernel functions, we discuss the simplest version of nearest neighbors
methods for simplicity.
19Thus, the nearest neighbor methodology was generalized to use several (k)
nearest neighbors (Fix and Hodges (1951, 1952)). In this approach, a simple
majority vote among the k nearest neighbors generates the prediction for
each case. Further, one may extend the decision rule to a weighted majority
vote (Royall (1966)), in which, among the k nearest neighbors, those that
are closer to the case at hand are weighted more heavily. One of the merits
of the nearest neighbor approaches is that one can bound their asymptotic
probability of error, relative to that of a Bayesian decision (Cover and Hart
(1967)). Further, k-nearest neighbors rules in which k tends to in￿nity with
the number of observations n but does so slowly (k/n → 0) enjoy universal
consistency: their probability of error tends to that of the Bayesian decision
for any underlying distribution from which the data are drawn (Stone (1977);
see Devroye, Gyor￿, and Lugosi (1996)).
As kernel classi￿ers, nearest neighbor classi￿ers are designed to select one
possible class for a new data point, rather than to rank all possible classes.
Yet it is straightforward to extend them to generate complete rankings: after
choosing the most plausible class by a vote among the nearest neighbors, one
can ignore all past cases of this class and use the remaining database to select
among the other categories, and so forth.
Our axioms provide a new perspective for the comparison of kernel classi-
￿ers and nearest neighbor classi￿ers. First, we observe that nearest neighbor
classi￿ers do not satisfy our Archimedean axiom. A single case that is clos-
est to the problem at hand will outweigh less similar cases, no matter how
many replications of these have been observed. Whether this is a merit or
a ￿aw of the nearest neighbor approach is probably a matter of taste. It
should be observed, however, that the Archimedean axiom is not very cru-
cial to the core of our theory. Dropping this axiom, one may still use a
separating theorem, with the modi￿cation that the separating hyperplane it-
self is not unambiguously categorized. Moreover, one may use lexicographic
separation, or separation by non-standard numbers. Correspondingly, one
20may obtain variations of Theorem 1 in which the numerical representation is
lexicographic or employs non-standard numbers.
A more interesting perspective for comparison is suggested by the combi-
nation axiom. A nearest neighbor approach employing but a single neighbor
satis￿es this axiom. Indeed, a 1-nearest neighbor ranking conforms with the
numerical representation of Theorem 1 provided that nonstandard numbers
are allowed. By contrast, for k>1 a majority vote among the k-nearest
neighbors violates the combination axiom. Take, for concreteness, k =3
(avoiding possible ties). Assume that a physician classi￿es a patient as ￿sick￿
or ￿healthy￿ according to the majority among the 3 closest known cases. Fur-
ther, assume that for a given patient there are six relevant cases, denoted
{a,b,c,d,e,f}.C a s e s a,d are of distance 1 from the case at hand, and in-
volved healthy patients, while cases b,c,e,f are of distance 2, and involved
sick patients. Given each of the databases {a,b,c} and {d,e,f},t h ep h y s i -
cian would classify the patient as sick. Given their union, she would conclude
that the patient is healthy. It appears that this violation of the combination
axiom is counter-intuitive.
If k grows with the number of observations n, our physician may use
more cases out of a database containing six cases than out of each of the
two databases containing three. Yet, k-nearest neighbors with k>1a r e
in fundamental con￿ict with the combination axiom. Intuitively, the reason
is that in these approaches the weight assigned to a past case depends not
only on the inherent similarity between it and the case at hand, but also
on its relative ranking, among other past cases, in terms of similarity. By
contrast, our approach gives each case a weight that depends only on itself,
irrespective of how many or which other cases are being taken into account.
214 Axiomatization of Maximum Likelihood Rank-
ing
So far, the main interpretation of our model deals with ranking eventualities
in a speci￿c prediction problem. But the model can also interpreted as refer-
ring to ranking of theories or hypotheses given a set of observations. Observe
that the axioms we formulated apply to this case as well. In particular, our
main requirements are that theories be ranked by a weak order for every
memory, and that, if theory x is more plausible than theory y given each
of two disjoint memories, x should also be more plausible than y given the
union of these memories.
Assume, therefore, that Theorem 1 holds. Suppose that, for each case c,
v(x,c) is bounded from above, and choose a representation v where v(x,c) <
0 for every theory x and case c.D e ￿ne p(c|x)=e x p ( v(x,c)), so that
log(p(c|x)) = v(x,c). Our result states that, for every two theories x,y:



















In other words, should a predictor rank theories in accordance with A1-
A4, there exist conditional probabilities p(c|x), for every case c and theory
x, such that the predictor ranks theories as if by their likelihood functions,
under the implicit assumption that the cases were stochastically independent.
On the one hand, this result can be viewed as a normative justi￿cation of
the likelihood rule: any method of ranking theories that is not equivalent
to ranking by likelihood (for some conditional probabilities p(c|x)) has to
violate one of our axioms. On the other hand, our result can be descriptively
22interpreted, saying that likelihood rankings of theories are rather prevalent.
One need not consciously assign conditional probabilities p(c|x) for every
case c given every theory x, and one need not know probability calculus
in order to generate predictions in accordance with the likelihood criterion.
Rather, whenever one satis￿es our axioms, one may be ascribed conditional
probabilities p(c|x) such that one￿s predictions are in accordance with the
resulting likelihood functions. Thus, relatively mild consistency requirements
imply that one predicts as if by likelihood functions.
Finally, our result may be used to elicit the subjective conditional proba-
bilities p(c|x) of a predictor, given her qualitative rankings of theories. How-
ever, our uniqueness result is somewhat limited. In particular, for every case
c one may choose a positive constant βc and multiply p(c|x)b yβc for all the-
ories x, resulting in the same likelihood rankings. Similarly, one may choose
a positive number α and raise all probabilities {p(c|x)}c,x to the power of
α, again without changing the observed ranking of theories given possible
memories. Thus there will generally be more than one set of conditional
probabilities {p(c|x)}c,x that are consistent with {%M}M∈M.
The likelihood function relies on independence across cases. Conceptually,
stochastic independence follows from two assumptions in our model. First,
we have de￿ned {%M}M∈M where each M is a set. This implicitly assumes
that only the number of repetitions of cases, and not their order, matters.
This structural assumption is reminiscent of de Finetti￿s exchangeability con-
dition (though the latter is de￿ned in a more elaborate probabilistic model).
Second, our combination axiom also has a ￿avor of independence. In partic-
ular, it rules out situations in which past occurrences of a case make future
occurrences of the same case less likely.
235 Discussion of the Axioms
We argue that our axioms are generally rather plausible and that the predic-
tion rule that they axiomatize is reasonably intuitive. The fact that this rule
generalizes rankings by empirical frequencies may also serve as an argument
in its favor. Moreover, it turns out that our key axioms are satis￿ed by well-
known methods for various problems of learning, prediction, or inference, as
shown in the previous two sections. This fact can also be cited as a piece of
evidence that the axioms are indeed plausible.
But there are applications in which the axioms do not appear compelling.
We discuss here several examples, trying to delineate the scope of applicabil-
ity of the axioms, and to identify certain classes of situations in which they
may not apply. In these situations one should take the linear aggregation
rule with a grain of salt, for descriptive and for normative purposes alike.
In the following discussion we do not dwell on the ￿rst axiom, namely,
that likelihood rankings are weak orders. This axiom and its limitations
have been extensively discussed in decision theory, and there seems to be no
special arguments for or against it in our speci￿cc o n t e x t .W ea l s oh a v el i t t l e
to add to the discussion of the diversity axiom. While it does not appear
to pose conceptual diﬃculties, there are no fundamental reasons to insist on
its plausibility either. One may well be interested in other assumptions that
would allow a representation as in (∗)b yam a t r i xv that is not necessarily
diversi￿ed. We therefore focus on the combination and the Archimedean
assumptions.
Mis-speci￿ed cases Consider a cat, say Lucifer, who every so often dies
and then may or may not resurrect. Suppose that, throughout history, many
other cats have been observed to resurrect exactly eight times. If Lucifer had
died and resurrected four times, and now died for the ￿fth time, we￿d expect
him to resurrect again. But if we double the number of cases, implying that
we are now observing the ninth death, we would not expect Lucifer to be
with us again. Thus, one may argue, the combination axiom does not seem
24to be very compelling.
Obviously, this example assumes that all of Lucifer￿s deaths are equiva-
lent. While this may be a reasonable assumption of a naive observer, the cat
connoisseur will be careful enough to distinguish ￿￿rst death￿ from ￿second
death￿, and so forth. Thus, this example suggests that one has to be careful
in the de￿nition of a ￿case￿ (and of case equivalence) before applying the
combination axiom.
Mis-speci￿ed theories Suppose that one wishes to determine whether
a coin is biased. A memory with 1,000 repetitions of ￿Head￿, as well as a
memory with 1,000 repetitions of ￿Tail￿ both suggest that the coin is indeed
biased, while their union suggests that it is not. As mentioned above, our
combination axiom makes an implicit assumption of stochastic independence.
Under this assumption, it is highly unlikely to observe such memories. That
is, adopting the combination axiom entails an implicit assumption that such
anomalies will not occur. But this example also shows that ambiguity in the
formulation of theories may make us reject the combination axiom. Speci￿-
cally, the theory that the coin is ￿biased￿, without specifying in what way it
biased, may be viewed as a mis-speci￿ed theory.
Theories about patterns A related class of examples deal with concepts
that describe, or are de￿ned by patterns, sequences, or sets of cases. Assume
that a single case consists of 100 tosses of a coin. A complex sequence of 100
tosses may lend support to the hypothesis that the coin generates random
sequences. But many repetitions of the very same sequence would undermine
this hypothesis. Observe that ￿the coin generates random sequences￿ is
a statement about sequences of cases. Similarly, statements such as ￿The
weather always surprises￿ or ￿History repeats itself￿ are about sequences
of cases, and are therefore likely to generate violations of the combination
axiom.
Overwhelming evidence There are situations in which a single case
may outweigh any number of repetitions of other cases, in contradiction to the
25Archimedean axiom. For instance, a physician may ￿nd a single observation,
taken from the patient she is currently treating, more relevant than any
number of observations taken from other patients.5 In the context of ranking
theories, it is possible that a single case c constitutes a direct refutation of
at h e o r yx. If another theory y was not refuted by any case in memory, a
single occurrence of case c will render theory x less plausible than theory y
regardless of the number of occurrences of other cases, even if these lend more
support to x than to y.6 In such a case, one would like to assign conditional
probability of zero to case c given theory x, or, equivalently, to set v(x,c)t o
−∞. More generally, one may extend Theorem 1 to provide representations
by non-standard numbers, allowing several levels of impossibility as well.
Second-order induction An important class of examples in which we
should expect the combination axiom to be violated, for descriptive and
normative purposes alike, involves learning of the similarity function. For in-
stance, assume that one database contains but one case, in which Mary chose
restaurant x over y.7 One is asked to predict what John￿s decision would be.
Having no other information, one is likely to assume some similarity of tastes
b e t w e e nJ o h na n dM a r ya n dt o￿nd it more plausible that John would prefer
x to y as well. Next assume that in a second database there are no observed
choices (by anyone) between x and y. Hence, based on this database alone,
it would appear equally likely that John would choose x as that he would y.
Assume further that this database does contain many choices between other
pairs of restaurants, and it turns out that John and Mary consistently choose
diﬀerent restaurants. When combining the two databases, it makes sense to
predict that John would choose y over x.
This is an instance in which the similarity function is learned from cases.
Linear aggregation of cases by ￿xed weights embodies learning by a similarity
5Indeed, the nearest neighbor approach to classi￿cation problems violates the
Archimedean axiom.
6This example is due to Peyton Young.
7This is a variant of an example by Sujoy Mukerji.
26function. But it does not describe how this function itself is learned. In
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) we call this process ￿second-order induction￿
and argue that the linear formula should only be taken as a very rough
approximation when such a process is involved.
Combinations of inductive and deductive reasoning Another im-
portant class of examples in which the combination axiom is not very rea-
sonable consists of prediction problems in which some structure is given.
Consider a simple regression problem where a variable x is used to predict
another variable y. Does the method of ordinary least squares satisfy our
axioms? The answer depends on the unit of analysis. If we consider the
regression equation y = a + bx and attempt to predict the values of a and
b given a sample {(xi,y i)}i≤n,t h ea n s w e ri si nt h ea ﬃrmative. The least
squares estimators of the parameters a and b are maximum likelihood esti-
mators in the standard statistical model of regression analysis. If we de￿ne
%M by the likelihood function for this model, the collection {%M}M will sat-
isfy the combination axiom. But if the units of analysis are the particular
values of y for a new value of x, the answer is negative.
The reason is that the regression model is structured enough to allow
some deductive reasoning. In ranking the plausibility of values of y for a
given value of x, one makes two steps. First, one uses inductive reasoning
to obtain estimates of the parameters a and b. Then, espousing a belief
in the linear model, one uses these estimates to rank values of y by their
plausibility. This second step involves deductive reasoning, exploiting the
particular structure of the model. While the combination axiom is rather
plausible for the ￿rst, inductive step, there is no reason for it to hold also for
the entire inductive-deductive process.8
To consider another example, assume that a coin is about to be tossed
in an i.i.d. manner. The parameter of the coin is not known, but one knows
8One may also view the examples discussed above under ￿theories about patterns￿ and
under ￿overwhelming evidence￿ as special cases of structured inference.
27probability rules that allow one to infer likelihood rankings of outcomes given
any value of the unknown parameter. Again, when one engages in inference
about the unknown parameter, one performs only inductive reasoning, and
the combination axiom seems plausible. But when one is asked about partic-
ular outcomes, one uses inductive reasoning as well as deductive reasoning.
In these cases, the combination axiom is too crude.9
In conclusion, there are classes of counterexamples to our axioms that re-
sult from under-speci￿cation of cases, of eventualities, or of memories. There
are others that are more fundamental. Among these, two seem to deserve
special attention. First, there are situations where second-order induction
is involved, and the similarity function itself is learned. Indeed, our model
deals with accumulated evidence but does not capture the emergence of new
insights. Second, there are problems where some theoretical structure is as-
sumed, and it can be used for deductive inferences. Our model captures some
forms of inductive reasoning, but does not provide a full account of inferential
processes involving a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning.
6 Other Interpretations
Decisions Theorem 1 can also have other interpretations. In particular, the
objects to be ranked may be possible acts, with the interpretation of ranking
as preferences. In this case, v(x,c) denotes the support that case c lends to
t h ec h o i c eo fa c tx. The decision rule that results generalizes most of the
decision rules of case-based decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001)),
as well as expected utility maximization, if beliefs are generated from cases
in an additive way (see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1999)). Gilboa, Schmeidler,
and Wakker (1999) apply this theorem, as well as an alternative approach,
to axiomatize a theory of case-based decisions in which both the similarity
9We have received several counterexamples to the combination axiom that are, in our
view, of this nature. In particular, we would like to thank Bruno Jullien, Klaus Nehring,
and Ariel Rubinstein.
28function between problem-act pairs and the utility function of outcomes are
derived from preferences. This model generalizes Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1997), in which the utility function is assumed given and only the similarity
function is derived from observed preferences.
Voting Another interpretation is the derivation of scoring rules in voting
theory, where cases are replaced by ballots, and eventualities ￿ by candi-
dates. Scoring rules have been axiomatized by Smith (1973), Young (1975),
and Myerson (1995). Whereas these models bear similarity to ours, several
diﬀerences exist. First, Smith and Young restrict the set of ballots to the per-
mutations of the set of candidates. Myerson allows an abstract set of ballots,
but employs a neutrality axiom, which relates the set of candidates to the
set of ballots. By contrast, our model does not presuppose any relationship
between cases and eventualities. This allows very diﬀerent interpretations as
in Sections 3 and 4 above, as well as scoring rules that do not satisfy sym-
metry. Second, while Smith assumes that selection is a complete ordering of
the candidates, Young and Myerson assume only a choice correspondence.
Our model, like Smith￿s, therefore assumes that more information is given
in the data. On the other hand, we derive an almost-unique matrix v and
can thus claim to provide a de￿nition of the scoring weights by in-principle
observable qualitative plausibility rankings.
Expected utility One may also use our result to derive a utility func-
tion in a two-person game, or in a ￿game against nature￿, that is, in a
decision problem. Assume that a decision matrix, or a two-person game,
is given, where the outcomes are abstract entities. Suppose that, for each
mixed strategy of nature, the decision maker has a ranking over her pure
strategies. Should these preferences satisfy our axioms (with some obvious
modi￿cations), one may attach a number to each outcome in the matrix such
that preferences are given by maximization of the expectation of these num-
bers. Of course, these ￿utility￿ numbers will be unique only up to additions
of numbers to columns, and multiplication of the entire matrix by a positive
29constant. Indeed, these are transformations that do not change the structure
of the best response correspondence is a game. (See Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1999) for more details and for comparison with the axiomatization of
expected utility maximization by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).)
Probabilities The main contribution of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1999) is
to generalize the scope of prediction from eventualities to events. That is, in
that paper we assume that the objects to be ranked belong to an algebra of
subsets of a given set. Additional assumptions are imposed so that similarity
values are additive with respect to the union of disjoint sets. Further, it is
shown that ranking by empirical frequencies can also be axiomatically char-
acterized in this set-up. Finally, tying the derivation of probabilities with
expected utility maximization, one obtains a characterization of subjective
expected utility maximization in face of uncertainty. As opposed to the be-
havioral axiomatic derivations of de Finetti (1937) and Savage (1954), which
infer beliefs from decisions, this axiomatic derivation follows a presumed cog-
nitive path leading from belief to decision.
Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fO b s e r v a t i o n :
It is obvious that ∼ is re￿exive and symmetric. To show that it is tran-
sitive, assume that c ∼ d and d ∼ e for distinct c,d,e.L e tM be such that
c,e / ∈ M.I fd/ ∈ M,t h e n%M∪{c}= %M∪{d} by c ∼ d and %M∪{d}= %M∪{c}
by d ∼ e,a n d%M∪{c}= %M∪{e} follows. If d ∈ M,d e ￿ne N = M\{d}.
Since c,d / ∈ N ∪ {e}, c ∼ d implies %N∪{e}∪{c}= %N∪{e}∪{d}. Similarly, since
d,e / ∈ N∪{c}, d ∼ e implies %N∪{c}∪{d}=%N∪{c}∪{e}. It follows that %M∪{c}=
%N∪{c,d}= %N∪{c,e}= %N∪{d,e}= %M∪{e}.⁄
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :
Let T = C/ ∼ be the set of types of cases.10 We prove the theorem in
three steps. First we assume that there are ￿nitely many types, that is, that
10C/ ∼ is the set of equivalence classes of ∼.
30|T| < ∞. In this case the proof relies on an auxiliary result that is of interest
in its own right. Since the proof of this theorem applies to an in￿nite set of
eventualities X, we do not restrict the cardinality of X in this case. Step 2
proceeds to deal with the case in which |T| is unrestricted, but X is ￿nite.
Lastly, Step 3 deals with the general case in which both |X| and |T| are
unrestricted.
In all three steps, memories in M are represented by vectors of non-
negative integers, counting how many cases of each type appear in memory.
Formally, for every T ⊂ T de￿ne JT = ZT
+ = {I |I : T → Z+} where Z+
stands for the non-negative integers. I ∈ JT is interpreted as a counter
vector, where I(t) counts how many cases of type t appear in the memory
represented by I.F o rI ∈ JT,i f{t|I(t) > 0} is ￿nite, de￿ne %I ⊂ X ￿ X
as follows. Choose M ∈ M such that M ⊂∪ t∈Tt (recall that t ⊂ C is an
equivalence class of cases) and I(t)=# ( M ∩ t)f o ra l lt ∈ T, and de￿ne
%I=%M. Such a set M exists since, by the richness assumption, |t| ≥ℵ 0
for all t ∈ T. For this reason, such a set M is not unique. However, if both
M1,M 2 ∈ M satisfy these properties, then M1 ∼ M2 and %M1=%M2.H e n c e
%I is well-de￿ned.
Moreover, this de￿nition implies the following property, which will prove
useful in the sequel: if I ∈ JT and I0 ∈ JT0 where T ⊂ T0, I0(t)=I(t) for
t ∈ T and I0(t) = 0 for t ∈ T 0\T,t h e n%I=%I0. Another obvious observation,
to be used later, is that for every M ∈ M there exist a ￿nite T ⊂ T and
I ∈ JT such that M ⊂∪ t∈Tt and I(t)=# ( M ∩ t)f o ra l lt ∈ T.
Step 1: The case |T| < ∞.
Denote the set of all counter vectors by J = JT= Z
T
+.F o r I ∈ J,d e ￿ne
%I ⊂ X ￿ X as above. We now re-state the main theorem for this case, in
the language of counter vectors. In the following, algebraic operations on J
are performed pointwise.
A1* Order: For every I ∈ J, %I is complete and transitive on X.
A2* Combination: For every I,J ∈ J and every x,y ∈ X,i fx %I y
31(x ￿I y)a n dx %J y,t h e nx %I+J y (x ￿I+J y).
A3* Archimedean Axiom: For every I,J ∈ J and every x,y ∈ X,i f
x ￿I y, then there exists l ∈ N such that x ￿lI+J y.
Observe that in the presence of Axiom 2, Axiom 3 also implies that for
every I,J ∈ J and every x,y ∈ X,i fx ￿I y, then there exists l ∈ N such
that for all k ≥ l, x ￿kI+J y.
A4* Diversity: For every list (x,y,z,w)o fd i s t i n c te l e m e n t so fX there
exists I ∈ J such that x ￿I y ￿I z ￿I w.I f |X| < 4, then for any strict
ordering of the elements of X there exists I ∈ J such that ￿I is that ordering.
Theorem 7 : Let there be given X, T,a n d{%I}I∈J as above. Then the
following two statements are equivalent:
(i) {%I}I∈J satisfy A1*-A4*;





for every I ∈ J and every x,y ∈ X,





Furthermore, in this case the matrix v is unique in the following sense: v
and u both satisfy (∗∗) iﬀ there are a scalar λ > 0 and a matrix β : X￿T → R
with identical rows (i.e., with constant columns) such that u = λv + β .
Theorem 7 is reminiscent of the main result in Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1997). In that work, cases are assumed to involve numerical payoﬀs, and
algebraic and topological axioms are formulated in the payoﬀ space. Here,
by contrast, cases are not assumed to have any structure, and the algebraic
and topological structures are given by the number of repetitions. This fact
introduces two main diﬃculties. First, the space of ￿contexts￿ for which
preferences are de￿ned is not a Euclidean space, but only integer points
thereof. This requires some care with the application of separation theorems.
32Second, repetitions can only be non-negative. This fact introduces several
complications, and, in particular, changes the algebraic implication of the
diversity condition.
Before proceeding with the proof, we ￿nd it useful to present a condition
that is equivalent to diversi￿cation of a matrix. We will use it both for the
matrix v : X ￿ T → R of Theorem 7 and the matrix v : X ￿ C → R of
Theorem 1. We therefore state it for an abstract set of columns:
Proposition 8 Let Y be a set. Assume ￿rst |X| ≥ 4. A matrix v : X￿Y →
R is diversi￿ed iﬀ for every list (x,y,z,w) of distinct elements of X,t h e
convex hull of diﬀerences of the row-vectors (v(x,•)−v(y,•)), (v(y,•)−v(z,•)),
and (v(z,•) − v(w,•)) does not intersect RY
−. Similar equivalence holds for
the case |X| < 4.
Proof: We prove the lemma for the case |X| ≥ 4. The proof for |X| < 4
is similar. Assume ￿rst that a matrix v is diversi￿ed. Assume that the con-
clusion does not hold. Hence, there are distinct x,y,z,w ∈ X and α,β,γ ≥ 0
with α + β + γ =1s u c ht h a t
α(v(x,•) − v(y,•)) + β(v(y,•) − v(z,•)) + γ(v(z,•) − v(w,•)) ≤ 0.








which means that v(x,•) is dominated by an aﬃne combination of {v(y,•),v(z,•),v(w,•)},
in contradiction to the fact that v is diversi￿ed. If α = 0, then, by a similar
argument, if β > 0, then v(y,•) is dominated by an aﬃne combination of
{v(z,•),v(w,•)}. Finally, if α = β =0 ,t h e nv(z,•) is dominated by v(w,•).
For the converse direction, assume that the convex hull of {(v(x,•) −
v(y,•)), (v(y,•)−v(z,•)), (v(z,•)−v(w,•))} (over all lists (x,y,z,w)o fd i s t i n c t
elements in X)d o e sn o ti n t e r s e c tRY
− but that, contrary to diversity of v,
there are distinct x,y,z,w ∈ X and λ,￿,θ ∈ R with λ+￿+θ =1s u c ht h a t
33(+) v(x,•) ≤ λv(y,•)+￿v(z,•)+θv(w,•).
Since λ + ￿ + θ =1 ,a tl e a s to n eo fλ,￿,θ is non-negative. Assume,
w.l.o.g., that θ ≥ 0. Hence λ + ￿ =1− θ ≤ 1. This means that at least one
of λ,￿cannot exceed 1. Assume, w.l.o.g., that λ ≤ 1. Inequality (+) can be
written as
v(x,•) − λv(y,•) − ￿v(z,•) − θv(w,•) ≤ 0
or, equivalently,
(v(x,•)−v(y,•))+(1−λ)(v(y,•)−v(z,•))+(1−λ−￿)(v(z,•)−v(w,•)) ≤ 0.
Since 1 − λ ≥ 0a n d1− λ − ￿ = θ ≥ 0, dividing by the sum of the
coeﬃcients yields a contradiction to the convex hull condition.⁄
Proof of Theorem 7: We present the proof for the case |X| ≥ 4. The
proofs for the cases |X| =2a n d|X| = 3 will be described as by-products
along the way.
We start by proving that (i) implies (ii). We ￿rst note that the following
homogeneity property holds:
Claim 1 For every I ∈ ZT
+ and every k ∈ N, %I=%kI.
Proof: Follows from consecutive application of the combination axiom. ⁄
In view of this claim, we extend the de￿nition of %I to functions I whose
values are non-negative rationals. Given I ∈ QT
+,l e tk ∈ N be such that
kI ∈ ZT
+ and de￿ne %I= %. %I is well-de￿ned in view of Claim 1. By the
de￿nition and Claim 1 we also have:
Claim 2 (Homogeneity) For every I ∈ QT
+ and every q ∈ Q , q>0:
%qI= %I .
C l a i m2 ,A 1 * ,a n dA 2 *i m p l y :
34Claim 3 (The order axiom) For every I ∈ QT
+ , %I is complete and tran-
sitive on X,a n d( t h ecombination axiom) for every I,J ∈ QT
+ and every
x,y ∈ X and p,q ∈ Q , p,q > 0:i fx %I y (x ￿I y) and x %J y,t h e n
x %pI+qJ y (x ￿pI+qJ y) .
Two special cases of the combination axiom are of interest: (i) p = q =1 ,
and (ii) p+q =1 . Claims 2 and 3, and the Archimedean axiom, A3*, imply
the following version of the axiom for the QT
+ case:
Claim 4 (The Archimedean axiom) For every I,J ∈ QT
+ and every x,y ∈
X,i fx ￿I y, then there exists r ∈ [0,1) ∩ Q such that x ￿rI+(1−r)J y.
It is easy to conclude from Claim 3 and 4 that for every I,J ∈ QT
+
and every x,y ∈ X,i fx ￿I y, then there exists r ∈ [0,1) ∩ Q such that
x ￿pI+(1−p)J y for every p ∈ (r,1) ∩ Q.
The following notation will be convenient for stating the ￿rst lemma. For
every x,y ∈ X let
Axy ≡ {I ∈ QT
+ | x ￿I y} and
Bxy ≡ {I ∈ QT
+ | x %I y}.
Observe that by de￿nition and A1*: Axy ⊂ Bxy,B xy ∩ Ayx = ∅, and
Bxy ∪ Ayx = QT
+.T h e￿rst main step in the proof of the theorem is:
Lemma 1 For every distinct x,y ∈ X there is a vector vxy ∈ RT such that,
(i) Bxy = {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I ≥ 0};
(ii) Axy = {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I>0};
(iii) Byx = {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I ≤ 0};
(iv) Ayx = {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I<0};
(v) Neither vxy ≤ 0 nor vxy ≥ 0;
(vi) −vxy = vyx.
Moreover, the vector vxy satisfying (i)-(iv), is unique up to multiplication by
a positive number.
35The lemma states that we can associate with every pair of distinct even-
tualities x,y ∈ X as e p a r a t i n gh y p e r p l a n ed e ￿ned by vxy • ξ =0( ξ ∈ RT),
such that x %I y iﬀ I is in the half space de￿ned by vxy • I ≥ 0. Observe
that if there are only two alternatives, Lemma 1 completes the proof of suf-
￿ciency: for instance, one may set vx = vxy and vy = 0. It then follows that
x %I y iﬀ vxy • I ≥ 0, i.e., iﬀ vx • I ≥ vy • I. More generally, we will show in
the following lemmata that one can ￿nd a vector vx for every alternative x,
such that, for every x,y ∈ X, vxy is a positive multiple of (vx − vy).
Before starting the proof we introduce additional notation: let b Bxy and
b Axy denote the convex hulls (in RT)o fBxy and Axy, respectively. For a
subset B of RT let int(B) denote the set of interior points of B.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :We break the proof into several claims.
Claim 5 For every distinct x,y ∈ X, Axy ∩ int( b Axy) 6= ∅ .
Proof: By the diversity axiom Axy 6= ∅ for all x,y ∈ X,x 6= y. Let I ∈
Axy ∩ ZT
+ and let J ∈ ZT
+ with J(t) > 1 for all t ∈ T. By the Archimedean
axiom there is an l ∈ N such that K = lI + J ∈ Axy. Let (ξj)2|T|
j=1 be the
2|T| distinct vectors in RT with coordinates 1 and −1. For j, (j =1 ,...,2|T|),
de￿ne ηj = K + ξj. Obviously, ηj ∈ QT
+ for all j. By Claim 4 there is an
rj ∈ [0,1) ∩ Q such that ςj = rjK +( 1− rj)ηj ∈ Axy (for all j). Clearly,
the convex hull of { ςj | j =1 ,...,2|T|}, which is included in b Axy,c o n t a i n sa n
open neighborhood of K. ⁄
Claim 6 For every distinct x,y ∈ X, b Byx ∩ int( b Axy)=∅ .
Proof: Suppose, by way of negation, that for some ξ ∈ int( b Axy)t h e r ea r e
(ηi)k
i=1 and (λi)k
i=1, k ∈ N such that for all i, ηi ∈ Byx, λi ∈ [0,1], Σk
i=1λi =1 ,
and ξ = Σk
i=1λiηi. Since ξ ∈ int( b Axy), there is a ball of radius ε > 0 around ξ
included in b Axy.L e tδ = ε/(2Σk
i=1||ηi||)a n df o re a c hi let qi ∈ Q∩[0,1] such
that |qi− λi| < δ ,a n dΣk
i=1qi =1 .H e n c e ,η = Σk
i=1qiηi ∈ QT
+ and ||η−ξ|| < ε,
which, in turn, implies η ∈ b Axy ∩ QT
+. Since for all i : ηi ∈ Byx, consecutive
36application of the combination axiom (Claim 3) yields η = Σk
i=1qiηi ∈ Byx.
On the other hand, η is a convex combination of points in Axy ⊂ QT
+ and thus
it has a representation with rational coeﬃcients (because the rationals are
an algebraic ￿eld). Applying Claims 3 consecutively as above, we conclude
that η ∈ Axy ￿ a contradiction.⁄
T h em a i ns t e pi nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a1 :The last two claims imply that
(for all x,y ∈ X,x 6= y) b Bxy and b Ayx satisfy the conditions of a separating
hyperplane theorem. (Namely, these are convex sets, where the interior of
one of them is non-empty and does not intersect the other set.) So there is
av e c t o rvxy 6=0a n dan u m b e rc so that
v
xy • I ≥ c for every I ∈ b B
xy
v




xy • I>c for every I ∈ int(b B
xy)
v
xy • I<c for every I ∈ int( b A
yx) .
By homogeneity (Claim 2), c =0 . Parts (i)-(iv) of the lemma are
restated as a claim and proved below.
Claim 7 For all x,y ∈ X,x 6= y: Bxy = {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I ≥ 0}; Axy = {I ∈
QT
+ | vxy•I>0}; Byx = {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy•I ≤ 0};a n dAyx = {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy•I<
0}.
Proof: (a) Bxy ⊂ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I ≥ 0} follows from the separation result
and the fact that z =0 .
(b) Axy ⊂ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I>0}:a s s u m et h a tx ￿I y, and, by way of
negation, vxy •I ≤ 0. Choose a J ∈ Ayx∩int( b Ayx). Such a J exists by Claim
5. Since z =0 ,J satis￿es vxy •J<0. By Claim 4 there exists r ∈ [0,1) such
that rI+(1−r)J ∈ Axy ⊂ Bxy.B y( a ) ,vxy•(rI+(1−r)J) ≥ 0. But vxy•I ≤ 0
and vxy • J<0, a contradiction. Therefore, Axy ⊂ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I>0}.
37(c) Ayx ⊂ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy•I<0}: assume that y ￿I x and, by way of nega-
tion, vxy•I ≥ 0. By Claim 5 there is a J ∈ Axy with J ∈ int( b Axy) ⊂ int(b Bxy).
The inclusion J ∈ int(b Bxy) implies vxy • J>0. Using the Archimedean ax-
iom, there is an r ∈ [0,1) such that rI +( 1− r)J ∈ Ayx. The separation
theorem implies that vxy•(rI+(1−r)J) ≤ 0, which is impossible if vxy•I ≥ 0
and vxy •J>0. This contradiction proves that Ayx ⊂ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy •I<0}.
(d) Byx ⊂ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I ≤ 0}: assume that y %I x,a n d ,b yw a y
of negation, vxy • I>0. Let J satisfy y ￿J x.B y ( c ) ,vxy • J<0. De￿ne
r =( vxy•I)/(−vxy•J) > 0. By homogeneity (Claim 2), y ￿rJ x. By Claim 3,
I +rJ ∈ Ayx. Hence, by (c), vxy •(I +rJ) < 0. However, direct computation
yields vxy • (I + rJ)=vxy • I + rvxy • J = 0, a contradiction. It follows that
Byx ⊂ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I ≤ 0}.
(e) Bxy ⊃ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I ≥ 0}: follows from completeness and (c).
(f) Axy ⊃ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I>0}: follows from completeness and (d).
(g) Ayx ⊃ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I<0}: follows from completeness and (a).
(h) Byx ⊃ {I ∈ QT
+ | vxy • I ≤ 0}: follows from completeness and (b). ⁄
Completion of the proof of the Lemma.
Part (v) of the Lemma, i.e., vxy / ∈ RT
+ ∪ RT
− for x 6= y, follows from
the facts that Axy 6= ∅ and Ayx 6= ∅. Before proving part (vi), we prove
uniqueness.
Assume that both vxy and uxy satisfy (i)-(iv). In this case, uxy • ξ ≤ 0
implies vxy • ξ ≤ 0 for all ξ ∈ RT
+. (Otherwise, there exists I ∈ QT
+ with
uxy • I ≤ 0 but vxy • I>0, contradicting the fact that both vxy and uxy
satisfy (i)-(iv).) Similarly, uxy • ξ ≥ 0i m p l i e svxy • ξ ≥ 0. Applying the
same argument for vxy and uxy,w ec o n c l u d et h a t{ξ ∈ RT
+ | vxy • ξ =0 } =
{ξ ∈ RT
+ | uxy • ξ =0 }.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e int( b Axy) 6= ∅ and int( b Ayx) 6= ∅,
it follows that {ξ ∈ RT
+ | vxy • ξ =0 } ∩ int(RT
+) 6= ∅.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t
{ξ ∈ RT | vxy • ξ =0 } = {ξ ∈ RT | uxy • ξ =0 }, i.e., that vxy and uxy have
the same null set and are therefore a multiple of each other. That is, there
exists α such that uxy = αvxy. Since both satisfy (i)-(iv), α > 0.
38Finally, we prove part (vi). Observe that both vxy and −vyx satisfy (i)-
(iv) (stated for the ordered pair (x,y)). By the uniqueness result, −vxy =
αvyx for some positive number α. At this stage we rede￿ne the vectors
{vxy}x,y∈X from the separation result as follows: for every unordered pair
{x,y} ⊂ X o n eo ft h et w oo r d e r e dp a i r s ,s a y( y,x), is arbitrary chosen and
then vxy is rescaled such that vxy = −vyx.( I fX is uncountable the axiom of
choice has to be used.)⁄
Lemma 2 For every three distinct eventualities, x,y,z ∈ X,a n dt h ec o r r e -






The key argument in the proof of Lemma 2 is that, if vxz is not a linear
combination of vxy and vyz,o n em a y￿nd a vector I for which ￿I is cyclical.
If there are only three alternatives x,y,z ∈ X,L e m m a2a l l o w su st o
complete the proof as follows: choose an arbitrary vector vxz that separates
between x and z. Then choose the multiples of vxy and of vyz de￿ned by the
lemma. Proceed to de￿ne vx = vxz, vy = βvyz,a n dvz = 0. By construction,
(vx−vz) is (equal and therefore) proportional to vxz, hence x %I z iﬀ vx•I ≥
vz • I.A l s o , ( vy − vz) is proportional to vyz and it follows that y %I z iﬀ
vy • I ≥ vz • I. The point is, however, that, by Lemma 2, we obtain the
same result for the last pair: (vx − vy)=( vxz − βvyz)=αvxy and x %I y iﬀ
vx • I ≥ vy • I follows.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
First note that for every three distinct eventualities, x,y,z ∈ X,i fvxy
and vyz are colinear, then for all I either x ￿I y ⇔ y ￿I z or x ￿I y ⇔
z ￿I y. Both implications contradict diversity. Therefore any two vec-
tors in {vxy,v yz,vxz} are linearly independent. This immediately implies the
uniqueness claim of the lemma. Next we introduce
39Claim 8 For every distinct x,y,z ∈ X, and every λ,￿∈ R,i fλvxy+￿vyz ≤
0,t h e nλ = ￿ =0 .
Proof: Observe that Lemma 1(v) implies that if one of the numbers λ,
and ￿ is zero, so is the other. Next, suppose, per absurdum, that λ￿ 6=0 , a n d
consider λvxy ≤ ￿vzy.I f ,s a y ,λ,￿>0, then vxy•I ≥ 0 necessitates vzy•I ≥ 0.
Hence there is no I for which x ￿I y ￿I z, in contradiction to the diversity
axiom. Similarly, λ > 0 >￿precludes x ￿I z ￿I y; ￿>0 > λ precludes
y ￿I x ￿I z;a n dλ,￿ < 0 implies that for no I ∈ QT
+ i si tt h ec a s et h a t
z ￿I y ￿I x. Hence the diversity axioms holds only if λ = ￿ =0 .⁄
We now turn to the main part of the proof. Suppose that vxy,vyz, and
vzx are column vectors and consider the |T|￿3 matrix (vxy,v yz,vzx)a sa
2-person 0-sum game. If its value is positive, then there is an ξ ∈ ∆(T)s u c h
that vxy •ξ > 0, vyz •ξ > 0, and vzx•ξ > 0. Hence there is an I ∈ QT
+ ∩∆(T)
that satis￿es the same inequalities. This, in turn, implies that x ￿I y, y ￿I z,
and z ￿I x - a contradiction.
Therefore the value of the game is zero or negative. In this case there are
λ,￿,ζ ≥ 0, such that λvxy + ￿vyz + ζvzx ≤ 0a n dλ + ￿ + ζ =1 . The claim
above implies that if one of the numbers λ,￿and ζ is zero, so are the other
two. Thus λ,￿,ζ > 0. We therefore conclude that there are α = λ/ζ > 0
and β = ￿/ζ > 0s u c ht h a t
(1) αvxy + βvyz ≤ vxz
Applying the same reasoning to the triple z,y,a n dx,w ec o n c l u d et h a t
there are γ,δ > 0s u c ht h a t
(2) γvzy + δvyx ≤ vzx.
Summation yields
(3) (α − δ)vxy +( β − γ)vyz ≤ 0.
40Claim 8 applied to inequality (3) implies α = δ and β = γ.H e n c e
inequality (2) may be rewritten as αvxy + βvyz ≤ vxz, which together with
(1) yields the desired representation.⁄
Lemma 2 shows that, if there are more than three alternatives, the like-
lihood ranking of every triple of alternatives can be represented as in the
theorem. The question that remains is whether these separate representa-
tions (for diﬀerent triples) can be ￿patched￿ together in a consistent way.
Lemma 3 There are vectors {vxy}x,y∈X,x6=y, as in Lemma 1, such that for
any three distinct acts, x,y,z ∈ X, the Jacobi identity vxy +vyz = vxz holds.
Proof: The proof is by induction, which is trans￿nite if X is uncountably
in￿nite. The main idea of the proof is the following. Assume that one has
rescaled the vectors vxy for all alternatives x,y in some subset of acts A ⊂ X,
and one now wishes to add another act to this subset, w 6∈ A.C h o o s ex ∈ A
and consider the vectors vxw,vyw for x,y ∈ A. By Lemma 2, there are unique
positive coeﬃcients α,β such that vxy = αvxw + βvwy .O n e w o u l d l i k e t o
show that the coeﬃcient α = αy does not depend on the choice of y ∈ A.
We will show that, if αy d i dd e p e n do ny, one would ￿nd that there are
x,y,z ∈ A such that the vectors vxw,vyw,vzw are linearly dependent, and
this would contradict the diversity axiom.
Claim 9 Let A ⊂ X, |A| ≥ 3, w ∈ X\A. Suppose that there are vectors
{vxy}x,y∈A,x6=y, as in Lemma 1, and for any three distinct acts, x,y,z ∈ X,
vxy+vyz = vxz holds. Then there are vectors {vxy}x,y∈A∪{w},x6=y, as in Lemma
1, and for any three distinct acts, x,y,z ∈ X, vxy + vyz = vxz holds.
Proof:C h o o s ed i s t i n c tx,y,z ∈ A.L e t￿ vxw,￿ vyw,a n d￿ vzw be the vectors
provided by Lemma 1 when applied to the pairs (x,w), (y,w), and (z,w),
respectively. Consider the triple {x,y,w}. B yL e m m a2t h e r ea r eu n i q u e
coeﬃcients λ({x,w},y),λ({y,w},x) > 0 such that
41(I) vxy = λ({x,w},y)￿ vxw + λ({y,w},x)￿ vwy
Applying the same reasoning to the triple {x,z,w},w e￿nd that there
are unique coeﬃcients λ({x,w},z),λ({z,w},x) > 0 such that
vxz = λ({x,w},z)￿ vxw + λ({z,w},x)￿ vwz.
or
(II) vzx = λ({x,w},z)￿ vwx + λ({z,w},x)￿ vzw.
We wish to show that λ({x,w},y)=λ({x,w},z). To see this, we con-
sider also the triple {y,z,w} and conclude that there are unique coeﬃcients
λ({y,w},z),λ({z,w},y) > 0 such that
(III) vyz = λ({y,w},z)￿ vyw + λ({z,w},y)￿ vwz.
Since x,y,z ∈ A,w eh a v e
vxy + vyz + vzx =0
and it follows that the summation of the right-hand sides of (I), (II), and
(III) also vanishes:
[λ({x,w},y) − λ({x,w},z)]￿ vxw +[ λ({y,w},z) − λ({y,w},x)]￿ vyw+
[λ({z,w},x) − λ({z,w},y)]￿ vzw =0 .
If some of the coeﬃcients above are not zero, the vectors {￿ vxw,￿ vyw, ￿ vzw}
are linearly dependent, and this contradicts the diversity axiom. For instance,
if ￿ vxw is a non-negative linear combination of ￿ vyw and ￿ vzw,f o rn oI will it be
t h ec a s et h a ty ￿I z ￿I w ￿I x.
We therefore obtain λ({x,w},y)=λ({x,w},z) for every y,z ∈ A\{x}.
Hence for every x ∈ A there exists a unique λ({x,w}) > 0 such that, for
42every distinct x,y ∈ Av xy = λ({x,w})￿ vxw + λ({y,w})￿ vwy.D e ￿ning vxw =
λ({x,w})￿ vxw completes the proof of the claim.⁄
To complete the proof of the lemma, we apply the claim consecutively.
In case X is not countable, the induction is trans￿nite (and assumes that X
can be well ordered).⁄
Note that Lemma 3, unlike Lemma 2, guarantees the possibility to rescale
simultaneously all the vxy-s from Lemma 1 such that the Jacobi identity will
hold on X.
We now complete the proof that (i) implies (ii). Choose an arbitrary act,
say, g in X.D e ￿ne vg = 0, and for any other alternative, x,d e ￿ne vx = vxg,
where the vxg-s are from Lemma 3.
Given I ∈ QT
+ and x,y ∈ X we have:
x %I y ⇔ v
xy • I ≥ 0 ⇔ (v
xg + v
gy) • I ≥ 0 ⇔
(v
xg − v
yg) • I ≥ 0 ⇔ v
x • I − v
y • I ≥ 0 ⇔ v
x • I ≥ v
y • I
The ￿rst implication follows from Lemma 1(i), the second from the Jacobi
identity of Lemma 3, the third from Lemma 1(vi), and the fourth from the
de￿nition of the vx-s. Hence, (∗∗) of the theorem has been proved.
It remains to be shown that the vectors de￿ned above are such that
conv({vx − vy,v y − vz,vz − vw}) ∩ RT
− = ∅. Indeed, in Lemma 1(v) we have
shown that vx − vy / ∈ RT
−. To see this one only uses the diversity axiom for
the pair {x,y}. Lemma 2 has shown, among other things, that a non-zero
linear combination of vx−vy and vy−vz cannot be in RT
−, using the diversity
axiom for triples. Linear independence of all three vectors was established
in Lemma 3. However, the full implication of the diversity condition will be
clari￿ed by the following lemma. Being a complete characterization, we will
also use it in proving the converse implication, namely, that part (ii) of the
theorem implies part (i). The proof of the lemma below depends on Lemma
1. It therefore holds under the assumptions that for any distinct x,y ∈ X
there is an I such that x ￿I y.
43Lemma 4 For every list (x,y,z,w) of distinct elements of X, there exists
I ∈ J such that





− = ∅ .
Proof: There exists I ∈ J such that x ￿I y ￿I z ￿I w iﬀ there exists I ∈ J
such that vxy • I,vyz • I,vzw • I>0. This is true iﬀ there exists a probability
vector p ∈ ∆(T) such that vxy • p,vyz • p,vzw • p>0.
Suppose that vxy,vyz, and vzw are column vectors and consider the |T|￿3
matrix (vxy,vyz,vzw) as a 2-person 0-sum game. The argument above implies
that there exists I ∈ J such that x ￿I y ￿I z ￿I w iﬀ the maximin in this
game is positive. This is equivalent to the minimax being positive, which
means that for every mixed strategy of player 2 there exists t ∈ T that
guarantees player 1 a positive payoﬀ. In other words, there exists I ∈ J such
that x ￿I y ￿I z ￿I w iﬀ for every convex combination of {vxy,v yz,vzw} at
least one entry is positive, i.e., conv({vxy,vyz,v zw}) ∩ RT
− = ∅. ⁄
This completes the proof that (i) implies (ii). ⁄
Part 2: (ii) implies (i)
It is straightforward to verify that if {%I}i∈QT
+ are representable by {vx}x∈X
as in (∗∗), they have to satisfy Axioms 1-3. To show that Axiom 4 holds, we
quote Lemma 4 of the previous part. ⁄
Part 3: Uniqueness
It is obvious that if ux = αvx+β for some scalar α > 0, a vector β ∈ RT,
and all x ∈ X, then part (ii) of the theorem holds with the matrix u replacing
v.
Suppose that {vx}x∈X and {ux}x∈X both satisfy (∗∗) ,a n dw ew i s ht o
show that there are a scalar α > 0a n dav e c t o rβ ∈ RT such that for all
x ∈ X, ux = αvx + β. Recall that, for x 6= y, vx 6= λvy and ux 6= λuy for all
0 6= λ ∈ R by A4.
Choose x 6= g (x,g ∈ X, g satis￿es vg = 0). From the uniqueness part of
Lemma 1 there exists a unique α > 0 such that (ux−ug)=α(vx−vg)=αvx.
44De￿ne β = ug.
We now wish to show that, for any y ∈ X, uy = αvy + β. It holds for
y = g and y = x, hence assume that x 6= y 6= g. Again, from the uniqueness

























x +( γ − δ)v
y =0.
Since vx 6= vg =0 ,vy 6= vg =0 ,a n dvx 6= λvy if 0 6= λ ∈ R,w e
get α = γ = δ. Plugging α = γ into (uy − ux)=γ(vy − vx)p r o v e st h a t
uy = αvy + β. ⁄
This completes the proof of Theorem 7. ⁄⁄
We now turn to complete the proof of Step 1. First we prove that (i)
implies (ii). Assume that {<M}M satisfy A1-A4. It follows that {<I}I
satisfy A1*-A4*. Therefore, there is a representation of {<I}I by a matrix
v : X ￿ T → R as in (∗∗) of Theorem 7. We abuse notation and extend
v to speci￿c cases. Formally, we de￿ne v : X ￿ C → R as follows. For
x ∈ X and c ∈ C,d e ￿ne v(x,c)=v(x,t)f o rt ∈ T ≡ C/ ∼ such that
c ∈ t.W i t h t h i s d e ￿nition, (∗)o fT h e o r e m1h o l d s . O b v i o u s l y ,c ∼ d
implies v(•,c)=v(•,d). The converse also holds: if v(•,c)=v(•,d), (∗)
implies that c ∼ d. Finally, observe that, for every distinct four eventualities
x,y,z,w ∈ X, the vectors v(x,•),v(y,•),v(z,•),v(w,•) ∈ RC are obtained
from the corresponding vectors in RT by replication of columns. Since v :
X ￿ T → R is diversi￿ed, we also get that v : X ￿ C → R is diversi￿ed.
45We now turn to prove that (ii) implies (i). Assume that a diversi￿ed
matrix v : X ￿ C → R, respecting case equivalence, is given. One may then
de￿ne v : X ￿ T → R by v(x,t)=v(x,c)f o rt ∈ T = C/ ∼ such that c ∈ t,
which is unambiguous because v(•,c)=v(•,d) whenever c ∼ d. Obviously,
(∗∗)o fT h e o r e m7f o l l o w sf r o m( ∗) of Theorem 1, and v : X ￿ T → R is
diversi￿ed as well. De￿ning {<I}I by the matrix v : X￿T → R and (∗∗), we
￿nd that {<I}I satisfy A1*-A4*. Also, <M=<IM for every M ∈ M.H e n c e
{<M}M satisfy A1-A4.
To see that uniqueness holds, assume that v,u : X ￿C → R both satisfy
(∗) of Theorem 1, and respect case equivalence. De￿ne v,u : X ￿ T → R as
above. The uniqueness result in Theorem 7 yields the desired result. ⁄⁄
Step 2: The case of arbitrary |T| and ￿nite |X|.
We ￿rst prove that (i) implies (ii). Observe that a representation as in (ii)
is guaranteed for every ￿nite T ⊂ T, provided that T is rich enough to satisfy
the diversity axiom A4. We therefore restrict attention to such sets T,a n d
show that the representations obtained for each of them can be ￿patched￿
together.
For every ordered list (x,y,z,w) ∈ X,c h o o s eM ∈ M such that x ￿M
y ￿M z ￿M w. Such an M exists by A4. Let M0 be the union of all sets M
so obtained. Since X is ￿nite, so is M0, i.e., M0 ∈ M.L e tT0 be the set of
types (equivalence classes) of cases in M0.C h o o s eg ∈ X.A p p l yT h e o r e m
7 to obtain a representation of {<I}I∈JT0 by vT0 : X ￿ T0 and (∗∗) for all
I ∈ JT0 ≡ Z
T0
+ ,s u c ht h a tvT0(g,•)=0 . F o re v e r y￿nite T ⊂ T such that
T0 ⊂ T, apply Theorem 7 again to obtain a representation of {<I}I∈JT by
vT : X ￿ T and (∗∗) for all I ∈ JT ≡ ZT
+, such that vT(g,•)=0a n ds u c h
that vT extends vT0. vT is uniquely de￿ned by these conditions. Moreover,
if T ⊂ T1 ∩ T2,T 0 ⊂ T,a n dT1 and T2 are ￿nite, then the restriction of vT1
and of vT2 to T coincide. The union of {vT}|T|<∞ de￿nes v : X ￿ T → R
satisfying (∗∗) for all I ∈ JT for some ￿nite T ⊂ T.D e ￿ning v on X ￿ C
as above yields a function that satis￿es (∗) of Theorem 1 and that respects
46case equivalence.
We now turn to prove that (ii) implies (i). Given a representation via
a matrix v : X ￿ C → R as in (∗), it follows that {<M}M satisfy A1 and
A 2 . A 3a l s oh o l d ss i n c ev respects case equivalence. It remains to show
that the above, for a diversi￿ed v,i m p l y A 4 .A s s u m e n o t .T h e nt h e r ea r e
distinct (x,y,z,w) ∈ X such that for no ￿nite memory M is it the case that
x ￿M y ￿M z ￿M w. We wish to show that this condition contradicts the
fact that v is diversi￿ed.
By diversi￿cation of v we know that
conv{(v(x,•) − v(y,•)),(v(y,•) − v(z,•)),(v(z,•) − v(w,•))} ∩ RC
− = ∅.
This implies that, for every vector (α,β,γ) in the two-dimensional simplex
∆2,i ti sn o tt h ec a s et h a t
α(v(x,•) − v(y,•)) + β(v(y,•) − v(z,•)) + γ(v(z,•) − v(w,•)) ≤ 0.
In other words, for every (α,β,γ) ∈ ∆2 there exists a case c ∈ C such
that
α(v(x,c) − v(y,c)) + β(v(y,c) − v(z,c)) + γ(v(z,c) − v(w,c)) > 0.
Thus
{ (α,β,γ) ∈
∆2|α(v(x,c) − v(y,c)) + β(v(y,c) − v(z,c)) + γ(v(z,c) − v(w,c)) > 0}c∈C
is an open cover of ∆2 in the relative topology. But ∆2 is compact in this
topology. Hence it has an open sub-cover. But this implies that there is a
￿nite memory M ∈ M such that, restricting v to X ￿ M,
conv{(v(x,•) − v(y,•)),(v(y,•) − v(z,•)),(v(z,•) − v(w,•))} ∩ RM
− = ∅.
Let T be the set of types of cases appearing in M.D e ￿ne v : X ￿T → R
as above. It also follows that
47conv{(v(x,•) − v(y,•)),(v(y,•) − v(z,•)),(v(z,•) − v(w,•))} ∩ RT
− = ∅.
By Theorem 7 this implies that there exists I ∈ JT for which x ￿I y ￿I
z ￿I w.L e tM0 be a set of cases such that I(t)=# ( M0∩t), and M0 ⊂∪ t∈Tt.
It follows that x ￿M0 y ￿M0 z ￿M0 w, a contradiction.
Finally, uniqueness follows from the uniqueness result in Step 1. ⁄⁄
Step 3: T h ec a s eo fi n ￿nite X, T.
We ￿rst prove that (i) implies (ii). Choose e,f,g,h ∈ X.F o r A0 =
{e,f,g,h} there exists a diversi￿ed function vA0 : A0 ￿C → R satisfying (∗)
and respecting case equivalence, as well as vA0(e,•)=0 .M o r e o v e r ,a l ls u c h
functions diﬀer only by a multiplicative positive constant. Fix such a function
b vA0. For every ￿nite set A ⊂ X such that A0 ⊂ A, there exists a diversi￿ed
function vA : A ￿ C → R satisfying (∗) and respecting case equivalence.
Moreover, there exists a unique vA that extends b vA0. Let us denote it by b vA.
We now de￿ne v : X ￿ C → R.G i v e n x ∈ X,l e tA be a ￿nite set such
that A0∪{x} ⊂ A.D e ￿ne v(x,•)=b vA(x,•). This de￿nition is unambiguous,
since, for every two ￿nite sets A1 and A2 such that A0∪{x} ⊂ A1,A 2,w eh a v e
b vA1(x,•)=b vA1∪A2(x,•)=b vA2(x,•). To see that v satis￿es (∗), choose x,y ∈ X
and consider A = A0 ∪ {x,y}.S i n c ev(x,•)=b vA(x,•), v(y,•)=b vA(y,•)a n d
b vA satis￿es (∗)o nA, v satis￿es (∗)o nX. Next consider respecting case
equivalence, namely, that v(•,c)=v(•,d)i ﬀ c ∼ d. The ￿if￿ part follows
from the fact that, if c ∼ d,t h e nf o re v e r y￿nite A, b vA(•,c)=b vA(•,d). As
for the ￿only if￿ part, it follows from the representation by (∗)a si nS t e p1 .
Finally, to see that v is diversi￿ed, let there be given x,y,z,w and choose
A = A0 ∪ {x,y,z,w}.S i n c eb vA is diversi￿ed, the desired conclusion follows.
The that (ii) implies (i) is follows from the corresponding proof in Step 2,
because each of the axioms A1-A4 involves only ￿nitely many eventualities.
F i n a l l y ,u n i q u e n e s si sp r o v e na si nS t e p1 .⁄⁄⁄
Proof of Proposition 2 ￿ Insuﬃciency of A1-3:
48We show that without the diversity axiom representability is not guaran-
teed. We provide two counterexamples. The ￿rst is combinatorial in nature.
The second highlights the role of the diversity axiom in obtaining separability.
Example 1:L e tX = { a,b,c,d }, T = {1,2,3} and C = T ￿ N.D e ￿ne
the vectors in R3:
vab =( −1,1,0); vac =( 0 ,−1,1); vad =( 1 ,0,−1);
vbc =( 2 ,−3,1); vcd =( 1 ,2,−3); vbd =( 3 ,−1,−2) ,
and vxy = −vyx and vxx =0f o rx,y ∈ X.
For x,y ∈ X and I ∈ Z3
+ de￿ne: x %I y iﬀ vxy • I ≥ 0.F o rM ∈ M,l e t
IM ∈ Z3
+ be the corresponding count vector: IM(i)=# {(i,j)|(i,j) ∈ M}
for i ∈ T, and de￿ne %M=%I.
It is easy to see that with this de￿nition the axioms of continuity and
combination, and the completeness part of the order axiom hold. Only tran-
sitivity requires a proof. This can be done by direct veri￿cation. It suﬃces
to check the four triples (x,y,z)w h e r ex,y,z ∈ X are distinct and in alpha-
betical order. For example, since 2vab +vbc = vac, a %I b and b %I c imply a
%I c.
Suppose by way of negation that there are four vectors in R3, va,v b,vc,vd
that represent %Ifor all I ∈ J as in Theorem 1. By the uniqueness of rep-
resentations of half-spaces in R3, for every pair x,y ∈ X there is a positive,
real number λ
xy such that λ
xyvxy =( vx − vy). Further, λ
xy = λ
yx.



























Combining the above equalities we get λ
ac =8 λ
ca, a contradiction.
Obviously the diversity axiom does not hold. For explicitness, consider
the order (b,c,d,a). If for some I ∈ J,s a yI =( k,l,m), b ￿I c and c ￿I d,
49then 2k−3l+m>0a n dk+2l−3m>0. Hence, 4k−6l+2m+3k+6l−9m =
7k − 7 œ m>0. But d ￿I a means m − k>0, a contradiction.
The above shows that the relations {%M}M∈M de￿ned by {%I}I∈Z3
+ can-
not be represented by v that respects equivalence. We now need to show
that a matrix v that does not respect case equivalence cannot represent
{%M}M∈M either. Assume that such a matrix existed. Consider memories
Mj = {(1,j),(2,1)}. For every j ∈ N, a ≈Mj b. Hence v(a,(1,j)) is indepen-
dent of j. By similar arguments one shows that v respects case equivalence.
Example 2 :L e t X =[ 0 ,1]2 and let %L be the lexicographic order
on X.D e ￿ne, for every non-empty M ∈ M, %M=%L,a n d%∅= X ￿ X.
It is easy to see that {%M}M∈M satisfy A1-3. However, there cannot be a
representation as in (∗) since for any non-empty M, %M is not representable
by a real-valued function.⁄
P r o o fo fR e m a r k3 : In light of the proof of Theorem 1, it suﬃces to
prove the corresponding remark in the framework of Theorem 7.
Assume that |T| = 6. (The proof for |T| > 6 will follow trivially.) Let
T = {1,2,3,4,5,6} and X = R+.W e d e ￿ne a matrix v : T￿X → R as
follows. For x ∈ X de￿ne the row corresponding to x in the matrix v to be
vx =( −x3,−x2,−x,x,x2,x 3). De￿ne ”I by the matrix v via (∗∗). It suﬃces
to show that v is diversi￿ed.
Let there be given distinct x,y,z,w ≥ 0. Assume that, contrary to
diversi￿cation, there are nonnegative numbers α,β,γ,w i t hα + β + γ =1 ,
such that
α(vx − vy)+β(vy − vz)+γ(vz − vw) ≤ 0.
Comparing the ￿rst and the last components of the vector on the left
hand side, we obtain
α(x3 − y3)+β(y3 − z3)+γ(z3 − w3)=0
or
50αx3 +( β − α)y3 +( γ − β)z3 − γw3 =0 .
Similarly, the second and the ￿fth inequalities yield
αx2 +( β − α)y2 +( γ − β)z2 − γw2 =0 .
Finally, the third and fourth inequalities imply
αx +( β − α)y +( γ − β)z − γw =0 .
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is of full rank. Hence, (y3,z3,w 3) is spanned by {(yn,zn,wn)}n=0,1,2.
That is, there are a,b,c ∈ R such that
(y3,z3,w 3)=a(1,1,1) + b(y,z,w)+c(y2,z2,w2).
Combining this equality with (∗) yields x3 = a + bx + cx2.H e n c e
(x3,y3,z3,w3) is a linear combination of {(xn,yn,zn,w n)}n=0,1,2.B u t t h i s
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has determinant zero, a contradiction.
Case 2: Assume next that α = 0. We then obtain βyn+(γ−β)zn−γwn =






















































Due to the van der Monde theorem again, this can only hold if (β,γ −
β,−γ)=( 0 ,0,0), i.e., if β = γ = 0, in contradiction to the assumption that
α + β + γ =1 . ⁄
P r o o fo fR e m a r k4 :
Consider an example in which {%M}M rank eventualities by relative fre-
quencies, with a tie-breaking rule that is re￿ected by small additions to the
value of v. These small additions, however, vary from case to case and their
sum converges. Speci￿cally, let X = {1,2,3,4}.D e ￿ne T = {1,2,3,4}. T
will indeed end up to be the set of types of cases, as will become clear once
we de￿ne {%M}M. For the time being we will abuse the term and will refer
to elements of T as ￿types￿. Let the set of cases be C ≡ T ￿ N.W e n o w
turn to de￿ne v : X ￿ C → R.F o r x ∈ X, t ∈ T,a n di ∈ N,i fx 6= t,
v(x,(t,i)) = 0. Otherwise (i.e., if x = t), if x ∈ {1,2,3},t h e nv(x,(t,i)) = 1.
Finally, v(4,(4,i)) = 1 + 1
2i for i ∈ N.D e ￿ne {%M}M by v via (∗).
52We claim that two cases (t,i),(s,j) ∈ T ￿ N are equivalent ((t,i) ∼ (s,j))
iﬀ t = s.I ti se a s yt os e et h a ti ft 6= s,t h e n( t,i)a n d( s,j)a r en o te q u i v a l e n t .
(For instance, t ￿{(t,i)} s but s ￿{(s,j)} t.) Moreover, if t = s ∈ {1,2,3},t h e n
v(•,(t,i)) = v(•,(s,j)). By (∗), (t,i) ∼ (s,j). It remains to show that, for all
i,j ∈ N,( 4 ,i) ∼ (4,j) despite the fact that v(•,(4,i)) 6= v(•,(4,j)).
Observe, ￿rst, that {%M}M agree with relative frequency rankings. Specif-
ically, consider a memory M ∈ M.L e tIM ∈ Z4
+ bede￿ned by IM(t)=# {i ∈
N|(t,i) ∈ M } for t ∈ {1,2,3,4}. For any s,t ∈ {1,2,3,4},i fIM(t) >I M(s),
it follows that t ￿M s. Also, if IM(t)=IM(s)a n ds,t < 4, then t ≈M s.
Finally, if, for t ∈ {1,2,3}, IM(t)=IM(4), then 4 ￿M t.
Let there be given M ∈ M such that (4,i),(4,j) / ∈ M. The memories
M∪{(4,i)} and M∪{(4,j)} agree on relative frequencies of the types, that is,
IM∪{(4,i)} = IM∪{(4,j)}.H e n c e%M∪{(4,i)}=%M∪{(4,j)} and (4,i) ∼ (4,j)f o l l o w s .
Thus v satis￿es (∗) but does not respect case equivalence.11⁄
Proof of Proposition 5: Assume a representation of {”M}M∈M by
v = vy as in (∗) of Theorem 1 that respects case equivalence. It is easy to
see that A5 is necessary for the representation we seek. To prove suﬃciency,
we ￿rst claim that for every x ∈ Rm,e v e r yd i s t i n c ta,b,d ∈ A, and every
i ∈ N, vy(a,(x,d,i)) = vy(b,(x,d,i)). To see this, assume, to the contrary,
that vy(a,(x,d,i)) >v y(b,(x,d,i)). Consider M such that b ￿M a (such an
M exists due to the diversity axiom). Adding enough cases of type (x,d)t o
M will generate a memory M0 such that, by (∗), a ￿M0 b, in contradiction
to A5.
Since the column vectors vy(•,(x,d,i)) may be shifted by a possibly dif-
ferent constant for each type of cases (x,d), there exists a representation
vy such that vy(a,(x,b,i)) = 0 for a 6= b. Moreover, this representation
11Observe that the relations {%M}M satisfy A1 and A2 (as they do whenever they are
de￿ned by some v via (∗)), as well as A4, but not A3. Indeed, such an example cannot be
generated if A3 holds as well. Speci￿cally, one can prove the following result: if {%M}M
are de￿ned by v via (∗), and satisfy A3 and A4, then v(x,c) − v(y,c)=v(x,d) − v(y,d)
whenever c ∼ d. If, for instance, v(e,•) ≡ 0f o rs o m ee ∈ X,t h e nv respects case
equivalence.
53is unique up to multiplication by a positive scalar. It remains to de￿ne
sy(x,a) ≡ vy(a,(x,a,i)) for some i ∈ N. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 : A6 is obviously implied by the numerical
representation we seek. We turn to prove that it is also suﬃcient. For x ∈ Rm
consider the memory M = {(x,a,1)|a ∈ A}. The symmetry axiom implies
that a ∼M b for every a,b ∈ A. But this is possible only if sy(x,a)=sy(x,b)
for every a,b ∈ A. ⁄
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